Sichuan Runrun scales back private financing and capex, redirecting focus to liquid-cooling infrastructure for data centers.

On September 28, Chuanrun Co. (002272.SZ) disclosed a revised capital raise plan, adjusting the total fundraising amount from no more than 950 million yuan to no more than 515 million yuan, eliminating the energy storage station and energy storage system integration project while retaining part of the liquid cooling system expansion and key components industrialization project, plus supplementary working capital.

This magnitude of change far exceeds typical adjustments—behind it lies dual pressure from regulatory inquiry and market expectations. Since July, the company's stock price has fallen cumulatively over 40%. The profitability model for energy storage stations is undergoing differentiation and restructuring amid policy shifts, while the liquid cooling track Chuanrun has pivoted toward faces its own real-world test: though 712 million yuan in on-hand orders is substantial, core component lead times are long and capacity ramp-up remains sluggish. The previous liquid cooling project concluded only in March 2026, with H1 capacity utilization at just 52.5%, and gross margin has declined steadily from 23.36% to 14.49%. Facing weak profitability, Chuanrun—a player crossing over from wind power hydraulics—must still prove the substance of its liquid cooling narrative through actual execution.

**Energy Storage Exits; Timeline of Fundraising Adjustments**

According to the announcement, on September 28 Chuanrun held its eleventh board meeting of the seventh term, approving a resolution to adjust the 2026 capital raise plan, reducing total fundraising from no more than 950 million yuan to no more than 514 million yuan—a reduction of approximately 45.8%—with clear trade-offs across allocation categories.

Only two components remain in the revised plan: first, the "liquid cooling system expansion and key components industrialization project" with 397 million yuan investment, unchanged; second, supplementary working capital, compressed from 282 million yuan to 117 million yuan. By contrast, the "energy storage station and energy storage system integration project" budgeted at 271 million yuan has been entirely eliminated.

This is viewed as further contraction following regulatory dialogue. On September 16, Chuanrun responded to the Shenzhen Exchange's capital raise review inquiry, clearly designating liquid cooling as a "strategic-level business" while disclosing that the previous fundraising project concluded with surplus funds of 54.3 million yuan directed entirely to working capital—accounting for 50.69% of prior fundraising, exceeding the regulatory ceiling of 30% on retained-funds-to-working-capital ratios. The company plans to correspondingly reduce 52.94 million yuan in this offering to ensure compliance.

With total fundraising compressed by nearly half, the 397 million yuan liquid cooling expansion now represents nearly 80% of adjusted total funds, underscoring the company's continued prioritization of the liquid cooling mainline. Chuanrun has repeatedly emphasized in inquiry responses and fundraising materials that liquid cooling is a "strategic-level business," disclosing approximately 1.8 billion yuan in unexecuted on-hand orders as of August 31, of which 712 million yuan in customer orders directly map to this capital raise's liquid cooling project.

Across 2024, 2025, and H1 2026, Chuanrun's liquid cooling system and product revenue grew from 127 million yuan to 225 million yuan to 109 million yuan, outpacing overall business growth rates considerably.

This also signals modest scale—despite strong growth, the contribution to total revenue (approximately 1.75 billion yuan) remains limited. The company's core business remains new energy fluid systems (wind power hydraulic lubrication and cooling), generating 389 million yuan in H1 2026 revenue representing 44% of total sales—the true revenue pillar. Liquid cooling currently remains a strategic emerging business, not yet a profit driver. Management also acknowledges that existing hydraulic, lubrication, and cooling system capacity is approaching saturation, with liquid cooling product capacity unable to cover signed and potential order demand.

Critically, gross margins continue eroding—revenue growth without profit growth. Liquid cooling gross margins stood at 23.36%, 19.28%, and 14.49% in 2024, 2025, and H1 2026 respectively, driven by severe cost management pressure from offshore wind power liquid cooling customers plus elevated prices for copper, aluminum, and other metals. The dual squeeze of falling selling prices and rising input costs compounds the margin compression; meanwhile, energy storage liquid cooling remains in early market development, with small scale, high fixed depreciation costs, high small-batch procurement premiums, and competitive pricing to capture share yielding weak margins.

At industry level, Wind data shows domestic liquid cooling CDU/cold plate gross margins typically range 10%-15%, with net margins around 5%-8%—a common malady reflecting that domestic liquid cooling profitability lags far behind overseas markets.

A plan cutting fundraising by nearly half inevitably invites investor scrutiny: was the original thesis sufficiently rigorous? Was ambition overreaching? The company explains this adjustment reflects comprehensive consideration of regulatory dialogue, market environment shifts, and strategic focus realignment, stressing liquid cooling as strategic while repositioning energy storage proactively following policy and profitability reassessment.

Each rationale holds some merit, yet repeated plan revisions raise fair questions about project rigor and capital discipline. Issues including retained-fund overages and questionable energy storage economics surfaced successively; secondary market shareholders ultimately absorbed the cost of miscalculation. Since April's capital raise announcement, Chuanrun's stock rose continuously, hitting 90 yuan all-time high in July before crashing afterward, ultimately down nearly 30% from April levels.

**On-Hand Orders Amid Capacity Constraints: How Liquid Cooling Shoulders the Load**

In the original plan, Chuanrun envisioned investing roughly 270 million yuan to enter the heavy-asset segments of energy storage stations plus system integration, combined with liquid cooling expansion and working capital to form a closed loop of liquid cooling equipment, energy storage systems, and energy storage stations.

This design reflected the "full-stack deployment" model once popular in energy: progressing from selling equipment to selling systems, selling assets, capturing long-term project cash flows and asset premiums. Through independent energy storage station investment, operations, and asset securitization, companies aimed to further secure long-term project cash flows and valuation uplift.

But 2025-2026 saw energy storage differentiate and decelerate. Policy-wise, "Document 136" eliminated mandatory energy storage requirements for new energy projects, shifting energy storage from power-side ancillary infrastructure to independent market participant, with deployment logic shifting from "administrative mandate" to "economic viability." Shortly after, the State Council Office issued Document 4 in February 2026, incorporating grid-side independent new-type energy storage into capacity pricing mechanisms, combined with local capacity compensation and ancillary service compensation, establishing a "three-pillar revenue framework" of energy quantity pricing, capacity compensation, and ancillary services.

Combined, energy storage stations can no longer compete on cost alone but must seek sustainable returns within spot price volatility, ancillary service rules, and capacity pricing implementation details.

Yet since September, per multiple supply chain sources and media reports, energy storage sector overcapacity risk has intensified, with authorities conducting comprehensive audits while new capacity project approvals have paused. However, this tightening is not blanket suspension; subsequent adjustments are expected based on actual market requirements.

The "China New-Type Energy Storage Development Report (2026)" and similar analyses note that certain independent energy storage stations have seen built-but-unused facilities and sustained losses, with some regions even witnessing post-commissioning shutdowns due to insufficient returns. Locally, provinces including Hebei conducted comprehensive energy storage project reviews, with numbers of independent storage projects lacking actual progress having timelines postponed or qualifications revoked.

This shift makes energy storage station profitability more dependent on electricity market judgment and trading capability. Research suggests that in provinces with favorable capacity prices and spot spreads, 4-hour independent energy storage stations can achieve 8%-12% internal rates of return once fully penetrating energy arbitrage, capacity compensation, and ancillary services, with certain regions exceeding 15%. However, given regional differences in electricity market maturity, price volatility, and compensation standards, many early projects have fallen markedly short of expected economics.

Investment scale and construction timelines result in 6-10 year energy storage station payback periods, requiring substantial upfront capital and equipment advances. By contrast, whether serving data centers, energy storage units, or wind turbine converters, liquid cooling revenue derives primarily from product sales and engineering delivery, with shorter project cycles and clearer payment schedules, representing lower long-term asset risk.

For investors, 2026 listed company capital raise contractions are unremarkable—what merits genuine attention is that Chuanrun, that "full-featured" doubler stock, has also proven honest with its body.