CXMT (ChangXin Memory)이 DRAM 및 NAND 메모리 시장에서 Samsung, SK Hynix, Micron의 3개 업체 독점에 맞서는 도전자로 떠오르고 있습니다.

On July 27, Changxin Memory Technologies (CXMT), China's largest DRAM manufacturer, debuted on the Shanghai Stock Exchange's Star Market. The highly anticipated listing saw the company's share price surge as much as 476% during intraday trading compared to its initial public offering price. CXMT's market cap skyrocketed to 3.14 trillion yuan, surpassing the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China to claim the country's top spot—a striking demonstration of the growing threat posed by China's semiconductor sector.

Beijing's semiconductor policy underwent a major shift following its trade dispute with the United States, and CXMT's IPO is a direct result of that reorientation. Previously, the Chinese government had sought to produce world-class chipmakers through policy support favoring leading companies. Amid escalating US trade tensions, China pivoted toward reconnecting its semiconductor ecosystem, disrupted by US export regulations, and fostering leading companies under a market-centric approach.

**The failed state model**

China's attempt at state-led semiconductor development proved an unmitigated failure. The centerpiece was the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, known as the "Big Fund"—a massive government initiative aimed at raising chip self-sufficiency. Launched in 2014, the fund was worth approximately $21 billion in its first phase and $29 billion in its second phase in 2019, providing enormous financial backing to chipmakers including SMIC, Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. (YMTC), CXMT and HiSilicon.

The policy's most notorious failure came with the Wuhan Hongxin Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (HSMC) fraud scandal. In 2017, the company—later exposed as a scam run by people with no semiconductor industry background—announced plans to invest around $18.5 billion to establish 14- and 7-nanometer manufacturing processes capable of producing 30,000 memory chips per month. HSMC recruited Chiang Shang-yi, the chief operating officer at TSMC, and named him CEO, then acquired state-of-the-art deep ultraviolet lithography equipment from ASML with government backing. The combination seemed foolproof.

Within two years, in late 2019, HSMC collapsed. The company faced lawsuits for unpaid construction costs of 51 million yuan as widespread corporate corruption and structural fraud came to light. The ASML equipment, which had been pledged as collateral to banks immediately after purchase, sat idle in a warehouse. Investigation revealed the semiconductor plant required further construction before operations could begin. Chiang resigned in mid-2020, describing his experience as "a nightmare." At least $2.3 billion in public funds vanished entirely.

Tsinghua Unigroup, once the symbol of China's semiconductor ambitions, had grown bold enough to announce plans to acquire Micron. By 2020, it had defaulted. Investigations uncovered widespread corruption and misconduct. Xiao Yaqing, the minister of industry and information technology who had shaped semiconductor policies, was placed under investigation. Ding Wenwu, the Big Fund's general manager, was also probed. Zhao Weiguo, Tsinghua Unigroup's former chairperson, received a death sentence with reprieve—a suspended sentence in which execution is deferred in favor of life imprisonment or a fixed term if no further crimes occur during the suspension period.

China's push to become a semiconductor powerhouse had been reduced to a pipe dream.

**Correcting course**

Following the corruption scandal, Beijing strictly limited the central government's indiscriminate subsidy distribution and froze support from local governments. The third phase of the Big Fund, launched in 2024, narrowed its focus to areas where US export restrictions had disrupted supply chains: lithography equipment, advanced materials, and high-bandwidth memory. Leading companies were required to go public, subjecting themselves to public oversight.

CXMT's model combined Western technology essential to semiconductors with long-term investment from local government. Zhu Yiming, CXMT's founder, graduated from Tsinghua University's physics department before studying in the United States, where Silicon Valley's innovation culture led him to shift toward electronic engineering and the semiconductor industry. After working as a project lead for memory chip development at an American cybersecurity company, he established GigaDevice in Silicon Valley. GigaDevice became the world's third-largest NOR flash manufacturer—a technology that consumes more power than NAND flash but offers faster read speeds, making it standard in cell phones—and successfully listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2016.

To boost China's DRAM self-reliance, Zhu partnered with the Hefei municipal government to launch Project 506, a manufacturing venture. Semiconductor manufacturing is both capital- and technology-intensive, requiring massive upfront investment and the ability to absorb losses over extended periods before production stabilizes. Private venture capital typically operates on shorter horizons and cannot provide the patient capital the industry demands. In Hefei, the city government stepped in, contributing 13.5 billion yuan—75% of the project's initial capital.

**The Hefei model**

Hefei has a track record of success. It invested 17.5 billion yuan in BOE Technology during the 2007 financial crisis, helping it become China's largest display manufacturer. It injected 7 billion yuan into NIO, an electric vehicle startup on the verge of bankruptcy in 2020, and turned it around. In this model, the municipal government does far more than provide administrative support; it acts as an early-stage anchor investor by absorbing risk and attracting materials, components, and equipment companies to build a regional industrial cluster.

CXMT's path to acquiring memory technology diverged from its rivals' missteps. Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit Co., a major competitor, crumbled after facing a US business suspension order for allegedly misappropriating Micron's trade secrets. CXMT navigated the patent landscape by acquiring technology from bankrupt German memory maker Qimonda. Before folding, Qimonda was the world's second-largest DRAM company and possessed its own unique architecture.

After announcing DDR4 production in 2019, CXMT rapidly expanded. Wafer processing capacity climbed from 40,000 per month in 2020 to 250,000 per month by 2025. Its global DRAM market share leapt from 3% in 2025 to 8% in 2026. As global memory shortages drove prices upward, CXMT posted profits exceeding 10 trillion won—capital that fueled further investment.

**Forced self-reliance**

US semiconductor export restrictions to China intensified domestic production efforts. China's domestic semiconductor equipment production rose from under 10% to over 30%. When equipment supplies were cut, Chinese companies prioritized availability over performance, repurposing outdated equipment that would have been discarded in an era of free trade and undertaking massive overhauls by mixing and matching parts. As US-China conflict forced Chinese engineers out of leading global equipment firms in the United States, many returned to China to lead technological development. Losses from lower yields were offset by government subsidies. Quantity growth soon translated into quality gains.

Lesser-known Chinese semiconductor equipment companies—Naura Technology, AMEC, SMEE—are now expanding rapidly. China has also reportedly developed lithography equipment, essential for manufacturing cutting-edge semiconductors.