미국은 엔비디아 칩 할당을 활용해 외교적 평화 합의를 도모했다.

When Armenia opened the largest AI facility in its region last month, we categorized it under compute diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal now reveals what that computing power actually secured. On Friday, Robbie Whelan reported that U.S. negotiators leveraged the promise of access to Nvidia’s AI chips to help broker a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which initialled a preliminary agreement last year. According to Whelan’s sources—individuals directly involved in the negotiations—the specific inducement was expanded approval for chip purchases tied to an Armenian data center project. The Journal notes this detail had not been previously reported and describes the arrangement as one of the most striking examples yet of what U.S. officials term “chip diplomacy.”

We initially covered the construction without knowing its strategic purpose. Firebird’s facility in Hrazdan opened in August, and we reported it at the time as the region’s largest AI factory. Our coverage highlighted the export license and compute diplomacy angles precisely because the regulatory approval itself was noteworthy. At the time, however, the underlying rationale remained unclear. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended the ribbon-cutting alongside technology and political leaders, standing beneath a banner displaying both Firebird and Nvidia logos. The Journal now reports that the very chips displayed behind that banner were among the factors that brought Pashinyan to the negotiating table.

Armenia and Azerbaijan spent decades in conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Their leaders initialled a preliminary agreement last year following White House intervention, and according to the Journal, a data center was embedded within the terms. The mechanism behind this leverage lies in export controls. Advanced Nvidia processors are strictly regulated, requiring Washington’s approval for any buyer outside a narrow circle of allied nations. Because this approval is discretionary, governments can grant, withhold, expand, or delay licenses without legislating new laws or allocating funds. In practice, an export license functions more like a visa than a subsidy. This discretion is precisely what makes it an effective diplomatic tool: a nation seeking to host AI infrastructure cannot simply purchase the necessary hardware without the license, and no amount of domestic capital can replace the restricted technology.

Firebird has executed similar arrangements elsewhere. In June, Kazakhstan signed a $10 billion agreement with the company to develop what it termed “Data Center Valley.” The project features the same Nvidia-backed developer and operational model, albeit in a different post-Soviet state. Viewed alongside the Armenian initiative, Firebird appears less like an independent data center operator navigating complex markets and more like a strategic instrument. Wherever it constructs facilities, American chips arrive under license, and American diplomatic influence follows.

Washington has deployed the same leverage in other regions, and we have been monitoring the outcomes. As we reported on Thursday, G42, the Abu Dhabi-based artificial intelligence company, is exploring the sale of a majority stake to American firms. The objective is to secure uninterrupted chip access beyond April 2027. This represents the same diplomatic currency being spent in reverse: a corporation restructuring its ownership to maintain hardware procurement. While Armenia received chip approvals in exchange for signing a peace accord, G42 is considering ceding corporate control to preserve access to the chips it already possesses. The underlying instrument remains identical.

The terminology the Journal attributes to U.S. officials is not new to our reporting. In May, we published an analysis of AMD CEO Lisa Su’s meeting with China’s vice premier in Beijing, titled “chip diplomacy intensifies.” By August, we applied the term “compute diplomacy” to the Armenian situation. This lexicon emerged organically because the underlying pattern was already evident prior to formal confirmation. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is pursuing its own sectoral ambitions. Local startups raised $2.6 million last year, establishing the baseline scale from which the country is currently operating.

The specifics of the agreement reveal substantial scale. The Journal’s reporting indicates that approximately 70,000 Nvidia processors underpin a proposed $5 billion Firebird project in Armenia. These figures were relayed through subsequent media coverage rather than the original paywalled article. Rev Lebaredian, a senior Nvidia executive of Armenian descent, told the Journal that chip diplomacy is “front and centre” for the current administration. He added that Nvidia’s operational presence in Armenia serves as a factor in fostering the conditions necessary for peace. Such a statement is atypical for a semiconductor executive, effectively framing commercial infrastructure deployment as a direct component of a diplomatic peace process in a market where his company’s hardware constituted the primary bargaining offer.

Jensen Huang participated via video link at the facility’s ribbon-cutting ceremony, characterizing the project as the inaugural step toward integrating the region into the global AI economy. Huang currently serves as an advisor to the president on artificial intelligence. Armenia is not the first jurisdiction where Washington has deployed this leverage. Subsequent reporting notes that AI hardware has similarly factored into agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, establishing the broader framework within which the G42 negotiations operate. The Armenian settlement also includes tangible infrastructure commitments. U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff has proposed constructing rail lines, pipelines, and road networks to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave, with construction slated to begin next year.

Despite the revelations, several critical details remain undisclosed, leaving observers unable to fully evaluate the arrangement. No public documentation outlines what Azerbaijan received in exchange, focusing exclusively on Armenia’s concessions. Furthermore, neither the specific terms of the export license, its attached conditions, nor the contingency provisions if the peace agreement collapses have been published. This remains a preliminary understanding rather than a ratified treaty. The U.S. Department of Commerce has not publicly addressed whether export licenses can be explicitly conditioned on diplomatic outcomes—a standard legal inquiry that remains unanswered. What is officially documented is narrower but nonetheless significant: a U.S. administration has formally treated advanced semiconductors as a geopolitical bargaining tool between two historically warring states, a reality confirmed on the record by a senior Nvidia executive.